How many privates are in the us army

Specialist SPC is considered one of the junior enlisted ranks in the U. Ranked above private first class E-3 and holding the same pay grade as the corporal, the specialist is not considered an NCO. The specialist's job is focused on technical expertise, and they normally have less personnel leadership responsibilities than corporals. They often are promoted to the E-4 pay grade due to enlisting.

Those enlisting with a four-year college degree or who have certain specialized civilian skills or training can enter BCT as a dpecialist. Along with the rank of sergeant, the corporal is the only rank that never has disappeared from the NCO Corps. The rank of corporal always has been placed at the base of the NCO ranks. For the most part, corporals have served as the smallest unit leaders in the Army: principally, leaders of teams.

Like the grade of sergeant, corporals are responsible for individual training, personal appearance and cleanliness of their soldiers. Moving up the Army ranks: Normally, unit commanders may advance PFCs to corporal once they have met the following qualifications:. Sergeants SGT operate in an environment where the sparks fly -- where the axe meets the stone. Although not the lowest level of rank where command is exercised, this level is the first at which enlisted soldiers are referred to as sergeant, and of all the grades of the NCO, this one, very possibly, has the greatest impact on the lower ranking-soldiers.

Privates, who are the basic manpower strength and grade of the Army, generally have sergeants as their first NCO leader. It is the grade sergeant that the privates will look to for example. Like the next grade, the staff sergeant, the sergeant is responsible for the individual training, personal appearance and the cleanliness of their soldiers.

The authority of the sergeant is equal to that of any other grade or rank of the NCO. Professionally competent leaders inherently command respect for their authority, and the sergeant must be unquestionably competent in order to carry out the mission correctly, accomplish each task and care for assigned soldiers.

The rank of sergeant is not a position for learning how to become a leader; no apprenticeship here. While certainly the new sergeant will be developing new skills, strengthening old ones and generally getting better, he is a sergeant and is therefore no less a professional than those grades of rank to follow. Moving up the Army ranks: Unlike the promotion processes for privates, specialists and corporals, promotions to sergeant SGT and staff sergeant SSG is based on an Army-wide competition.

The competition is based on a point system that grants points for firing range scores, performance evaluations, physical fitness, education level, awards and promotion board ranking. The staff sergeant rank closely parallels that of the sergeant in duties and responsibilities. In fact, the basic duties and responsibility of all the NCO ranks never change, but there are significant differences between this step in the NCO structure and the preceding one.

The major difference between the staff sergeant and the sergeant is not, as often mistakenly believed, authority but rather sphere of influence. The staff sergeant is in daily contact with large numbers of soldiers and generally has more equipment and other property to maintain.

The SSG often has one or more sergeants who work under their direct leadership. The SSG is responsible for the continued successful development of sergeants as well as the soldiers in their section, squad or team.

It's a lot different from what they told me. It's actually hard. It's a lot of work. She coauthored the new report, Life as a Private. But there is this honor in the everyday tasks of what the enlisted force does to keep the military moving, to keep it grounded and motivated and ready to do the incredible things that it might have to do. There is this dignity and honor in the enlisted profession that is hard to understand as an outsider.

The researchers interviewed 81 first-term soldiers. Most were between 19 and 21 years old; 11 were women; and many had never lived away from home before. They could not speak for the Army as a whole, or even for their own units or specialties. What they could provide, with their identities protected, was their own unfiltered take on life in the ranks. John P. Patton, a battalion mail clerk stationed in Iraq, sorts anywhere from to 4, packages and letters per week.

They had joined for adventure, benefits, and a sense of duty, in that order. Nearly two-thirds said a family member influenced their decision to join—a mother or father, an uncle who had fought in Vietnam, a two-year-old son.

Most saw the Army as their best chance to make a decent living, but a few had left jobs and taken pay cuts to join. They wanted to get out in the field, go on missions, jump out of airplanes—anything but sit around and shuffle papers. An enlisted private is the lowest in the army ranks. A private can eventually advance from this junior position to a corporal. From there, there are many other advancements, including sergeant , lieutenant, captain, major , and colonel , until some reach a general officer ranking.

This is a senior officer role with typically over 30 years of experience and is only second to general of the army during war time. Not everyone who starts as a private will move all of the way up the ranks to become a general , but every corporal , major, colonel, etc. Enlist your curiosity in learning about another group of terms that are commonly mixed up: martial vs. Don't Get Mixed Up Again! Get Dictionary. Email This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged. Previous "Dopamine" vs.

Feedback We've Added New Words! Word of the Day. Meanings Meanings. The United States contracted out its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For every American Soldier in Iraq or Afghanistan, there was at least one contractor—a ratio or greater. At the height of these wars, contractors comprised over 50 percent of the U. By comparison, only 10 percent of the force was contracted in World War II. About 15 percent were mercenaries, but do not let the small numbers fool you.

Contractors did most of the bleeding, too. In , contractor deaths represented only 4 percent of all fatalities. Ultimately, contractors are disposable people, like mercenaries in the past. Contracting has become a new American way of war, and trendlines indicate the United States may outsource 80 to 90 percent of its future wars.

Certainly, Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater International, thinks it should. In , he pushed replacing all American troops in Afghanistan with contractors—in other words, privatizing the war in Afghanistan with percent mercenaries.

In it, he lambasts senior military leadership. How did we get here? It has it all: the best troops, training, technology, equipment, and resources. But it does not have the will, and this is why it turns to military contractors. Contracting enables bloodless wars, at least from the perspective of the client. Like super technology, mercenaries are a crutch for a nation that wants to fight but does not wish to bleed. This happened not by design but rather by accident.

There was an unanticipated collision between American domestic politics and the all-volunteer military, a source of national pride. The U. This left policymakers with three terrible options. First, they could withdraw and concede defeat in disgrace. Second, they could reinstate a national draft to fill the ranks, like during the Vietnam War. This would be political suicide. Third, they could use contractors to fill the ranks, relying on them mostly for nonlethal tasks.

Unsurprisingly, policymakers chose contractors. Few realize that most of the contractors who fight in U. To keep costs down, military companies hire personnel from the developing world where military labor is cheap, making these firms densely international.

Central Command in Of these, only 20, were American. Most of these contractors were unarmed and performing nonmilitary jobs, therefore not mercenaries.

There were 2, armed contractors, of whom were Americans and 1, whom were foreigners. When I was in the industry, I worked alongside ex—special forces troops from places like the Philippines, Colombia, and South Africa. We did the same missions, but they got developing world wages and I did not. Mercenaries are just like T-shirts; they are cheaper in developing countries.

Call it the globalization of private force. What is significant for the future of the industry is that these foreigners have gained valuable trade knowledge that can be exported around the world, in search of new clients once the United States does not renew its contract. This spreads mercenarism. Today, most of the private military companies operating in Iraq and Afghanistan are local and less picky than their U.

The United States is partly to blame. Army hired eight civilian trucking firms to transport supplies to bases in Afghanistan, and also required the companies to provide their own security. In some ways this arrangement worked well; it effectively supplied most U.

However, a U. The congressional report, titled Warlord, Inc. That same year a U. Senate report confirmed the localization of the industry. Problematically, the only local organizations in conflict-affected states capable of providing private security are warlords, militias, and insurgents who swell the ranks of the marketplace. Bagram Air Base, a strategic U. The Afghanistan company Navin also supplied a guard force of men and armed convoy escorts to the air base and is owned by former mujahideen commander Lutfullah.

A now-defunct American company called U. Protection and Investigations partnered with Northern Alliance military commanders like General Din Mohammad Jurat to provide protection to former militia members. This model of force provision did not exist before the United States arrived.

In some cases, these native mercenary groups have restored order yet undermined the very institutions the Americans sought to build—a public police force, a national army, provincial administrations—elements of a Westphalian state. For example, Commando Security is a company that escorts convoys between Kandahar and Helmand Province to the west. But if the presence of Taliban is too big to crush, then make a deal. Supply can generate its own demand in a free market for force. Like medieval mercenaries , this new breed of mercenary can prove overly brutal when executing contracts, with little or no concern for human rights.

Ruhullah deals ruthlessly with those who impede the flow of his trucks regardless of whether they are Taliban or civilian. All this has led to major investment in private warfare, making war even bigger business. The total amount the United States paid for private security is unknown, and even Congress does not know despite the fact that it writes the checks.

Contracting is now part of the American way of war. It is one of the few issues in Washington that enjoys true bipartisan support, as Republican and Democratic White Houses rely on military contractors more and more, perhaps for the wrong reasons.

The implications are significant, especially for civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces, since using contractors may allow the executive branch to circumnavigate congressional oversight. Additionally, the United States has grown strategically dependent on the private sector to sustain wars, creating vulnerabilities that a clever adversary could exploit.

Heavy U. On the supply side, the United States has marshaled a global labor pool of mercenaries. Thousands of mercenaries got their start in Iraq or Afghanistan, and when those wars shrank, they set out looking for new conflict markets that is, war zones around the world, enlarging the wars there. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan allowed the private military industry to mature, with networks of mercenaries established and some modicum of best practices.

Others are imitating the American model, and every day new private military groups emerge from countries like Russia, Uganda, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Colombia.

Their services are more robust than Blackwater, offering greater combat power and the willingness to work for the highest bidder with scant regard for human rights. They are mercenary in every sense of the word. On the demand side, the United States has de facto legitimized mercenaries by using them so heavily. Can the United States really tell Russia not to use private military troops in Syria?

No, it cannot. New consumers are appearing everywhere, seeking security in an insecure world: oil and mining companies guarding their drill sites against militias, shipping lines defending their vessels against pirates, humanitarian organizations protecting their workers in dangerous locations, oligarchs who need professional muscle, countries that want to wage proxy wars, regimes fighting civil wars, guerrillas fighting back, and the super rich for any reason you can think of, no matter how petty.

The mercenary trade is growing because mercenaries offer what clients want. It is simple supply and demand. When you want to keep a secret, sometimes the private sector is murkier than government agencies. In the United States, for example, researchers possess tools to investigate public sector actors, such as the military and CIA, using the Freedom of Information Act or public hearings on Capitol Hill. Leakers are ubiquitous in Washington and rarely held accountable.

Not so in the private sector. These firms fire employees who talk to the press, and sometimes large firms threaten media outlets with multimillion-dollar lawsuits to chill free press. Government agencies do not do this, as evidenced by the landslide of military memoirs of secret operations during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

DOD did nothing. At least, not immediately. Government, but Owen was not tried as a felon for releasing classified information. If you want to keep a government secret, sometimes the private sector is better than the Pentagon or CIA.

This is attractive to some officials and a way of circumventing democratic accountability of the Armed Forces. For example, take the problem of mission creep. By , that number creeped to 9, troops, supported by more than 26, contractors—nearly a 3 to 1 ratio. Plausible deniability is another reason why the industry is flourishing. When a job is too politically risky, contractors are sometimes used because they can be disavowed if the mission fails.

Not so with the CIA or military. Special operations forces and CIA operatives do not get left behind, and this can be embarrassing for a nation caught running covert operations. Contractors can be abandoned with minimal political fallout. Americans do not fuss over contractor casualties, unlike dead Marines. Tellingly, Senator Obama sponsored a bill in to make armed contractors more accountable, a bill that President Obama later ignored. Nigeria initially repudiated media reports of them employing mercenaries against Boko Haram, until it became too difficult to deny.

Contractors are invisible people, making them a stealth weapon in more ways than one. Contractors are also cheaper, just as they have been for thousands of years. The cost of these savings may come at a high price. Mercenaries are not like army reservists, to be used only when you need them. Military contractors do not reintegrate into the civilian workforce after a war but instead look for new employers because they are profit-maximizing entities.

Worse, linking profit motive with killing encourages more war and suffering, making another Nisour Square incident inevitable. There are many reasons why private military contractors are a growth industry, but most of them are dubious. Forty years ago, the idea of using armed contractors was anathema to policymakers. Now it is routine. This is not a Democratic versus Republican issue, but an American one. Since the s, Presidents of both parties have used military contractors. More disturbing, others around the world are imitating this model, and it is evolving into a global free market for force.

Little is publicly known about the cagey world of mercenaries. Government intelligence agencies ignore them. Reporters are rarely able to interview mercenaries and can only record events surrounding the industry. Academics depend almost entirely on the work of journalists for their analyses and too often contort their findings with inappropriate theory.

What follows is an optic into the mercenary world. It is not comprehensive, but such a study is not feasible. Mercenaries are an illicit economy, like drug-traffickers and terrorist networks, and they resist investigation. Mercenaries are not the caricatures depicted in movies. They are complex people, like all people. It is true that some seek the lifestyle because they want to go rogue, but most do not.

When I was in the field, I met guns for hire with all sorts of stories: some wanted adventure, others needed a paycheck, a lot were more comfortable with war than peace, a few wished to help others amazing but true , and many just did not have a life plan. Being a military contractor has its practical appeals, too. A lot of American troops were deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, their home life was imploding: wife living with another man and filing for divorce, kids not recognizing their dad, personal bankruptcy, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Rates of suicide, divorce, and domestic violence spiked among Servicemembers during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. A lot of American contractors I met signed up because they wanted their life back. Almost all mercenaries have military or national police backgrounds. There are no mercenary basic training camps, so everyone starts somewhere else, usually in a national army.

Some of the larger military companies are associated with particular military units. In the U. A lot of military firms embed dog whistles to signal their credentials to attract high-end troops. Modern soldiers of fortune have a choice between overt or covert mercenary groups, and it is uncertain which one will dominate. This is important because it may influence future war, specifically who, how, and why people fight.

Overt private warriors seek legitimacy and wish to work in the open. They rebuff the mercenary label and call themselves private security companies, advocating full transparency and accountability according to the International Organization for Standardization ISO and ISO 39 business standards. Another facilitating organization is the International Code of Conduct Association ICOCA , a Swiss initiative that establishes industry standards that comply with human rights and international law.

Government and big oil companies are more likely to hire you. However, overt actors may disappear. Or, put another way, it is busywork good for public relations and little else. A few CEOs confided in me their frustration with the certification process as too much burden for too little reward. Like corporate social responsibility, companies will abandon these efforts if the cost-benefit ratio turns negative.

The overt business model is struggling, as marquee clients do not seem more likely to hire certified security providers. This is driving the entire industry underground, as it seeks new opportunities from clients not interested in transparency.

War could get medieval. The only way to prevent this future is counterintuitive. Governments, international organizations, NGOs, and other clients who claim they want a responsible private security sector should consider employing overt actors, rather than let them literally slip to the dark side. Customers can pool their market power, like a cartel, to enforce their best practices. This would shape the industry in fundamental ways, but this opportunity is fading.

The covert side of the market for force is far more dangerous. Mercenaries are hired for plausible deniability and therefore operate in the shadows. Few know the identity of the mercenaries operating in Syria, Ukraine, Nigeria, Yemen, and elsewhere. Fewer still know who exactly retained them and what they paid. Underground soldiers of fortune are employed for many reasons. Some consumers, like oil companies, want mercenaries because they have no security forces of their own and renting them may be preferable to relying on corrupt and incompetent host nation forces.

Others, like Nigeria, have security forces but need a niche capability, such as Mil Mi Hind attack helicopters or special operations forces teams. Still, others hire mercenaries to do things they do not want their own people doing, like human rights abuse. Historically, plausible deniability has always been a strong selling point of soldiers for hire.

How do you hire mercenaries? Overt actors seek public channels, such as their Web site and Internet job sites. Covert operations are a word-of-mouth business. Mercenaries form informal networks of shared military background, contacts, cultural identity, language, and so forth. When you make a deal with a client and initiate an operation, you recruit by tapping your network.

Trusted colleagues also recruit and vouch for their hires. Contrary to Hollywood depictions, reputation is the primary currency in the mercenary world, with money second. Those who forget this get burned. In , mercenaries attempted a takeover of oil-rich Equatorial Guinea.

Known as the Wonga Coup, it failed because of poor operational security. An individual recruited for the coup told South African, British, and American authorities of the plan, leading to the arrest of most of the mercenaries. A key problem in a word-of-mouth business are charlatans, and the mercenary world has many.

Good recruiters can spot them with a few qualifying questions, such as: What unit were you in? What years? Who was your commander? What operations did you conduct? Did you know Sergeant Bill Smith?

What was he like? Also, detailed questions about training works well.