Who is arlen price

Natelli, F. Section a provides:. To ascertain if sufficient evidence of robbery or attempted robbery exists,. We have consistently held that even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, it is the responsibility of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Mendicoa v. According to her, Appellant told her that he pulled out his gun and that.

And then he got down on his knees and grabbed ahold of Arlen and told him, begged him not to do this to him. Told him to just go away; that he would forget about it. And then they got to wrestling and the gun went off, but he said he didn't know if he hit Sonny or not.

At the trial, Appellant claimed that he lacked the mental capacity to form the requisite specific intent necessary to maintain a first-degree murder conviction.

To prove his contention, Appellant informed the district court that he intended to call a psychologist who would testify about Appellant's mental condition. The court stated that Appellant would have to lay a foundation for the psychologist's testimony by testifying himself because Appellant consulted the psychologist only for purposes of litigation, because Appellant had not pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and because the psychologist was not a witness to the crime. After the court informed Appellant of his right not to testify, Appellant took the stand and admitted killing Sonny.

We have stated many times that making the decision to allow an expert to testify is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Braley v. The district court erred, however, when, before the psychologist took the stand, it determined that Appellant's testimony was necessary to establish an adequate foundation for the psychologist's testimony.

Regardless of whether the district court based its directive on the relevancy requirement of W. An error warrants reversal if it is prejudicial and if it affects an appellant's substantial rights. Otherwise, the error is harmless. Loomer v. The district court's establishment of a foundation prerequisite was a harmless error for two reasons.

First, because Appellant's theory of defense was that his mental condition prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent for premeditated murder and not that he did not kill Sonny, his in-court admission that he killed Sonny did not incriminate him more than he had already been incriminated. Appellant could have limited the scope of the State's cross-examination. Once Appellant began testifying about Sonny's death, he opened the door for the State's inquiry into that matter.

The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. Several federal courts have determined that, when a defendant takes the witness stand, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to matters reasonably related to the subject matter of direct examination.

Aldridge v. Marshall, F. Hernandez, F. Panza, F. As a result, a defendant may testify in an effort to lay the foundation for the testimony of another witness without opening the door for the State to ask questions on cross-examination about the crime which the defendant is accused of committing.

United States, U. See also McGautha v. At the trial, the following colloquy occurred between Appellant's attorney and the psychologist:.

Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Arlen Price was able to control his behavior in so far as it related to Sonny Price? Control his behavior. I think that he was so obsessed and that he was compelled to do what he did, and I think that had he not done it some two or three -. Did you talk to him yesterday about whether suppose, for instance, Sonny Price was in this courtroom today and with the police all around what would he have to do?

Did you talk to him about that? It's a continuation of this obsession. Total obsession takes up a lot of his daily time, and state of mind of what has been inflicted upon him now. He wants to handle it. And I guess you've already testified that you've spent a great deal of time talking to the witnesses including Arlen Price; isn't that right? None whatsoever, as far as his being there.

I have talked with him at great length. I have some real reservations whether or not he actually did the crime. In the discussion which followed, the district court reiterated the rule that a diminished capacity defense does not exist in Wyoming. The court stated that the psychologist could not "testify about the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime or a defense; that the ultimate issue in that instance is left for the trier of fact.

Such standard should not be increased or decreased. We have rejected the rule that an expert cannot testify on the ultimate issue in a case.

Reed v. Hunter, P. Not only would the testimony have failed to assist the jury with its decision, but that testimony would have challenged the veracity of Appellant's testimony. The combination of his understanding of the facts of the crime with his medical opinion that Appellant would be compelled to take credit for the killing led the psychologist to doubt the veracity of Appellant's testimony.

In Smith v. In addition, the psychologist's testimony indicating he doubted that Appellant killed Sonny did not assist the jury. While the psychologist may have been an expert for the purposes of determining an individual's mental condition, he was in no better position than the jury to decide whether Appellant actually stabbed Sonny to death. When reviewing a district court's decision to deny a motion for acquittal, we apply the standard quoted in Mendicoa and determine whether sufficient evidence exists to sustain the charges.

Chavez v. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute.

Fulcher v. See also Polston v. As used in this section, the terms mental illness or deficiency mean only those severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person's perception or understanding of reality and that are not attributable primarily to self-induced intoxication as defined by W.

A plea of "not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency" may be pleaded orally or in writing by the defendant or his counsel at the time of his arraignment. The court, for good cause shown, may also allow that plea to be entered at a later time.

Such a plea does not deprive the defendant of other defenses. The majority finds harmless error in the giving of the testimony. If Price's testifying resulted in error, it was anything but harmless, for he described in vivid detail the crime for which he was convicted. I find no error, however, because Price waived his privilege against self-incrimination by voluntarily taking the stand. If the court's ruling that Price's expert could not testify unless Price testified was erroneous, that error was preserved whether Price testified or not.

Thus, Price was not forced to testify to preserve the error; nor may he decide to testify and create additional error. By waiving his right to remain silent at trial, I fail to see how he can claim error before this court. Let me put it a different way so there's no misunderstanding.

Price, you are the only one who ultimately finally makes a decision as to whether or not you testify. The court then asked Price if he had any questions. Price responded he did not know if he had any questions. The court suggested that Price should discuss the matter with his attorney.

Price's attorney then questioned Price to demonstrate that he was agreeing to testify on the attorney's advice in order to allow the psychologist to testify. Price affirmed that he alone had made the choice to testify. Harrison v. In Harrison, the defendant testified to rebut illegally obtained and erroneously admitted evidence against him.

Price makes no claim that his testimony was prompted by any tainted evidence. Rather, Price chose to testify as part of a defense strategy in an attempt to counter the State's evidence. United States v. Hearst, F. The only claim Price makes as to the State's evidence is that it was insufficient to convict him of felony murder. He does not argue about the propriety of the State's evidence.

Florida, U. The court states the "error" was harmless because it did not prejudice Price's substantial rights. However, the alleged error concerns his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Before a constitutional error can be held harmless, it must be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Campbell v. Price's direct testimony involved the intimate details of the killing for which he was convicted. Regardless of the other evidence in this case, I have much more than a reasonable doubt, indeed serious doubt, that such testimony was harmless. Unfortunately, the guilt of appellant Arlen Joe Price in the brutal murder of his homosexually, incestuously child raping uncle, Lewis "Sonny" Price, Jr.

Evil frequently lives on after its carrier has departed existence. That evil infected Brent E. Miller Chief who participated in the homicide, or more likely committed it himself, and then apparently chose to end it all by walking into the shotgun blast of the park ranger at Lake Mead in southern Nevada.

Comparably, this case should not be perpetrated upon future litigation without recognition of all encompassing tragedy, detail and horror from which this appellant's conviction and life sentence resulted.

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